Abstract. We show that given a PRFG (pseudo-random function generator) G that is (1/n c )-partially secure there exists a polynomial p such that the construction
Introduction
Cryptographers have noted that the Data Encryption Standard (DES) is effectively the composition of 16 insecure permutation generators. Because DES has withstood much cryptanalysis it is often considered to be a secure (given its small key size) pseudo-random permutation generator (PRPG). Similarly, AES, the predecessor of DES, is also based on the composition of at least nine insecure permutation generators, and, to date, it too has withstood much cryptanalysis. These constructions have led some cryptographers to attempt to provide evidence that supports the apparent observation that the composition of permutation generators can amplify security.
Following this line of research, Luby and Rackoff [12] defined the notion of a partially secure PRPG to be a permutation generator that produces permutations that cannot be efficiently distinguished from random permutations by small circuits with a probability better than 1/c, for some constant c > 1. They proved that the composition of a constant number of partially secure PRPGs results in a partially secure PRPG with stronger security than any of its constituent components. Unfortunately, Luby and Rackoff's result did not permit the construction of a PRPG from a partially secure PRPG.
It was known that the existence of a partially secure PRFG implied a totally secure PRFG. The construction used the following chain of results. It is possible to construct a weak one-way function from a partially secure PRFG; then, using Yao's lemma [17] , [11] , construct a one-way function; then, using the HILL result [7] , construct a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG); then, using GGM [5] , construct a PRFG. However, this construction is obviously neither "natural" nor efficient.
In this paper we give a natural, efficient and parallelizable construction for generating a PRFG from a partially secure PRFG. Our proof follows from the ideas of Luby and Rackoff [12] , [2] . Further, since partially secure PRPGs are a special case of partially secure PRFGs, we can use a partially secure PRPG to construct a PRFG. Then, using a previous result by Luby and Rackoff [13] , or more recent work by Naor and Reingold [16] , we can "naturally" and efficiently construct a PRPG from the PRFG. If F = {F n | n ∈ N} is a "partially secure" PRFG, then our construction is as follows:
where the f n i 's are randomly chosen from F n , and the r i 's are randomly chosen from {0, 1}
n . The key for this new generator consists of all the keys for the functions ( f i 's), and all of the strings of random bits (r i 's).
Our construction is similar to an XOR product, and in this light our proof might be considered an XOR lemma for a PRFG. Further support for this this view is found in the fact that our proof closely follows those of Levin's [11] and Luby and Rackoff's [12] , where Luby and Rackoff already followed the proof of Levin. Given that there are relatively few proofs that show security amplification in an unrestricted adversarial model, we think this result will be of interest to those researchers interested in security amplification. Further, we believe that this result can be viewed as one step in the long journey to developing a good theory for the development of block-ciphers. Currently, block-ciphers are developed primarily using heuristics, with little theory to guide the development of their underlying architecture. However, there are pragmatic examples of how the proposed construction might be of use to block-cipher designers. For instance, one pragmatic example of a partially secure PRFG might be block-ciphers with a large set of weak keys which make the cipher easy to break in some form or another. A block-cipher designer could use the construction on the cipher and reasonably expect to reduce the fraction of its weak keys. In practice there are examples of ciphers which have large numbers of weak keys. For instance, the block-cipher IDEA has 2 51 weak keys [3] . Of course, as the total number of keys is 2 128 this is not problematic in this example because a randomly chosen key is very unlikely to be weak.
Related Work
There are very few results in cryptography that demonstrate the amplification of security in a general, nonrestrictive adversarial model. The first such result was Yao's XOR Lemma [17] , which now has several proofs [11] , [8] , [6] . All of these results apply to the security amplification of weak one-way functions and weakly unpredictable predicates. In a domain closer to that of a PRFG, Luby and Rackoff [12] give a direct product lemma for a PRPG, where the direct product is taken via the composition of a weak PRPG. Unfortunately, their proof falls short of demonstrating that the direct product of a sufficient number of weak PRPGs yields a strongly secure PRPG, and the reasons for this case are explained in further detail in Section 3. Another direct product theorem for a PRFG is given by Myers [15] , where the direct product is based on the composition and exclusive-or of a PRFG. Unfortunately, this result also fails to achieve a strongly secure PRFG for reasons similar to those of Luby and Rackoff [12] , [2] . Further complicating matters with Myers' [15] result is the fact that the size of the constructed generator is super-polynomial after ω(log n) applications of the direct product, and this further restricts the amount of security amplification that can be performed. Therefore, our result presents the first efficient and natural direct product theorem achieving a strongly secure PRFG from a weakly secure PRFG in a general adversarial model.
Since Luby and Rackoff proposed their partial security model in [12] , cryptographers have developed other models where it is possible to demonstrate some forms of security amplification. Kilian and Rogaway [10] propose a model where component permutation generators are replaced with completely random permutation generators. Constructions using the generators are then analyzed, and their security compared with that of a random permutation generator. Note that in this model, since the permutation generators are random, attacks can only be performed on the construction, and not on the underlying component generators. Kilian and Rogaway call such attacks generic, as they do not make use of the underlying structure of the permutation generator. In this model Kilian and Rogaway [10] show that the DESX construction increases the effective key length of DES. Also in the same model, Aiello et al. [1] have shown that the composition of multiple random permutation generators results in a permutation generator that is more secure against generic attacks than an individual constituent permutation generator.
Notation, Definitions and the Model
Below we introduce some notation and terminology that are used in the paper.
Notation 1. For µ, ν ∈ {0, 1}
* , let µ • ν denote their concatenation.
Notation 2.
Let F l→ p denote the set of all functions f : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} p , and let F n be the set F n→n .
Notation 3.
For α, β ∈ {0, 1} n , let α ⊕ β denote the bit-by-bit exclusive-or of α and
.
Notation 5. For any set A, let x ∈ A be the action of uniformly at random choosing an element x from A. For any distribution D, let x ∈ D be the action of randomly choosing an element according to D. It will be clear from context when ∈ is used to refer to an element in a set, and when it refers to choosing from a distribution.
. . be a sequence of distributions, and let e represent a series of events e 1 , e 2 , . . . such that for all i, e i is an event of D i . We say that e occurs with significant probability if for some constant c > 0 and for infinitely many n the Pr D n (e n ) ≥ 1/n c . We say that an event e occurs with negligible probability if, for all constants c > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, Pr D n (e n ) < 1/n c .
Circuits
In the definition of each cryptographic primitive there exists the notion of an adversary. Abstractly, its purpose is to break an effect that a primitive is trying to achieve. Resource bounds are imposed on the adversaries, so that they model the computational power "real world" adversaries might feasibly have access to. There are two standard computational models that are used to define resource bounded adversaries: uniform and non-uniform.
To clarify the proof and make it more concise we present our results with respect to non-uniform adversaries. In Section 4.1 we discuss some of the more pertinent changes required in order to make the proof go through in the uniform model. A non-uniform adversary is a sequence of circuits (C 1 , C 2 , . . .), where circuit C i is used on inputs of size i. We wish to model efficient computation on the part of the adversary, so we assume that the size of each circuit C i is bounded by p(i), for some polynomial p. The size of a circuit is defined to be the number of gates and the number of connections between gates in the circuit. For simplicity we assume we have gates for all 16 binary and 4 unary functions.
In order to model the adversaries of certain primitives we allow the circuits to have access to an oracle. This is modeled by defining oracle gates to be gates of unit size that compute a specified function. The gates are otherwise treated like normal gates. An oracle function will normally be considered an input to the circuit.
We stress that the description of the circuit family need not be efficiently computable, even though each circuit is of small size relative to the size of its input. Definition 2. Let C be a circuit whose outputs are in the range {0, 1}. Then we say C is a decision circuit. Let x be an input to C. Then we say C accepts x if C(x) = 1, and we say that C rejects x if C(x) = 0.
Definition 3.
We say a circuit C is probabilistic if it requires as input a sequence of random bits in order to allow it to make random choices during its computation. 
Definition 4.
Let D be a distribution over the inputs of a decision circuit C. We say that C accepts a fraction Pr d∈D (C(d)) of its inputs, and rejects a fraction 1 − Pr d∈D (C(d)) of its inputs.
Notation 7.
We write C f to represent a circuit C that has oracle gates that compute the function f in unit time. We wish to consider this function as an "input" to the circuit, and therefore if f is of the form {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m(n) , for a polynomial m, then we say that f is part of C's input and it has size n. Notation 8. Let C be a circuit with access to the oracle function f . Then let Q C denote the number of oracle gates in C. (Note: Q is short for query.)
In the remainder of the paper we assume that all circuits are standardized in the following manner: no circuit will repeat oracle queries, and all circuits C n in a circuit family {C n } will perform exactly m(n) queries, for some polynomial m (that is Q C n = m(n)). Any polynomial-sized family of circuits can be easily modified to satisfy the above two requirements.
Function Generators
κ is a key of G, write G(k, ·) as g k (·) and say that key k chooses the function g k . Let g ∈ G represent the act of uniformly at random choosing a key k from {0, 1} κ , and then using the key k to choose the function g k .
Let m and be polynomials, and let N ⊆ N be an infinitely large set. For each
In an abuse of notation, we refer to both specific function generators and ensembles as function generators. 
Definition 7 (Pseudo-Random Function Generator Ensembles). Let m and be polynomials. For each n let
be a function generator, computable in time bounded by a polynomial in n. Define G = {G n | n ∈ N} to be the function generator ensemble. Define F = {F n→m(n) | n ∈ N}. We say that G is (1 − ε(n)) secure if there exists no adversary {C n }, bound in size to be polynomial in n, which can ε-distinguish G from F. We say that G is a pseudo-random function generator (PRFG) if it is 1 secure.
Definition 8.
If G is a 1-secure generator, we say it is strongly secure. If G is 1/ p(n) secure, for some polynomial p, then we say that it is partially secure. If G is not partially secure, then we say it is insecure.
The Chernoff Bound
Below is a well known form of the Chernoff Bound. For a proof of this result refer to [14] or any standard book on probabilistic computation.
. . be identical independently distributed random variables that take the values 0 or 1 with probabilities q or p
= 1 − q, respec- tively. Let X n t = (1/n t ) n t i=1 x i . Then
for any k and l, there exists a t such that
Pr |X n t − p| ≥ 1 n k ≤ 1 2 n l .
Result
We show that there is a "natural" construction that builds strongly secure PRFGs from partially secure PRFGs. The construction we present uses function generators that generate functions of the form f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , this is done to simplify the presentation, and the result can be easily modified to generate functions of the form f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m(n) , for any polynomial m. The construction is based on the operator generator described below.
Let f 1 and f 2 be two functions of the form {0,
, which acts on the functions f 1 and f 2 and produces a function of the form {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n as defined below:
We define the ✸ operator generator (read Diamond) as
n }. Before describing the construction we formally describe how to combine two function generators using the ✸ operator generator.
)(x), where |k 1 | = (n), |k 2 | = κ(n) and |k 3 | = |k 4 | = n. This is written in shorthand as F = G✸H.
Similarly, if g: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , then we write g✸H as short-hand for the function generator defined by
)(x), where |k 2 | = κ(n) and |k 3 | = |k 4 | = n.
The Construction
Let p be a polynomial. We construct the generator F from the generator G as follows:
Note that in order to compute a random function f ∈ F n it is sufficient to compute
where g i ∈ G n and r i ∈ {0, 1} n . Observe that the key for F includes p(n) keys for G and p(n) random strings.
The random strings used in the construction are necessary for the security amplification, and if they are omitted a counter-example to our security amplification claims can be easily constructed, as follows. Let F be a secure PRFG from which we construct a 1 2 -secure generator G. For each f ∈ F we have a corresponding function g ∈ G that is defined as
where0 represents a binary string of all 0's and FBZ is a predicate that takes a string and returns the same string with the first bit set to 0 (that is,
Intuitively this generator is 1 2 -secure as only half of the random functions f ∈ F will have f (0) commencing with the bit 0, whereas all of the functions g ∈ G will have this property. Excluding this distinction G is a duplicate of F, and therefore its functions are indistinguishable from random functions, and so this is the only advantage a distinguisher has in distinguishing G from F.
Consider the construction H = G ⊕ G, this is the same construction as G✸G, but without the random offsets r 1 and r 2 . It has the property that for every h ∈ H there exists g 1 , g 2 ∈ G such that h = g 1 ⊕ g 2 , and therefore h(0)'s first bit will always be 0: ensuring that H is not more than 1 2 -secure. This demonstrates that the offsets in the Diamond construction are in fact necessary for security amplification. We stress that our construction requires that both offsets be chosen randomly and thus are most likely different.
For further discussion on this construction and several other plausible candidates for security amplification see [15] .
Presentation
We proceed to proving the security amplification properties of the above construction. First we discuss some issues relating to how such proofs will be presented.
The arguments will be presented in a top-down fashion. We will begin by giving the intuition for the highest level of an argument, and then provide the technical details. Required lemmas will be stated, but in many cases proofs of the lemmas will be delayed until a later point in the paper.
In what follows, there are many proofs that deal with values that are approximations to the values of interest. Because of this, in many of the calculations there are many terms involving inverse polynomials that represent possible approximation errors. While it is important to ensure the calculations are correct with these error bounds, they are cumbersome and make the calculations seem more complicated than the underlying intuition suggests. Therefore, when intuitive explanations are presented we ignore all of the inverse polynomial approximation errors, and assume we are only dealing with the exact values we are trying to approximate.
We will be presenting asymptotic arguments that hold for either infinitely many or all sufficiently large n. For clarity, in all of the formal statements of claims, lemmas and theorems all appropriate indices will be included, but the index n will be fixed, where appropriate, in the proofs of such statements in order to simplify notation. Therefore, the following will hold when the index n is fixed: for any function ε: N → R, from the Naturals to a given range R, we use the ε to represent ε(n); for an arbitrary family of circuits {C n } we denote C n by C; and for an ensemble of function generators {G n } we denote G n by G. Finally, when presenting the intuition for a given argument we will be far more relaxed with the index n, often dropping it completely to prevent notation from obscuring the underlying intuition. It should be clear to the reader where the appropriate indices would appear.
Results
In order to prove the security of the construction we use the Diamond Isolation Lemma (the name for this lemma comes from the stylistically similar Isolation Lemma used by Levin [11] in proving Yao's XOR Lemma [17] ). Intuitively, the lemma shows that the function generator that results from the combination of two partially secure function generators by the ✸ operator generator is more secure than either of the two constituent generators. More specifically, if there are two generators, G and H, that respectively cannot be ε-and δ-distinguished, then the generator G✸H cannot be εδ-distinguished. As we will apply the Isolation Lemma iteratively, it is easier to work with if the lemma is stated in the contrapositive. Also, because of the iterative application of the lemma we need to be concerned about the sizes of the distinguishing circuits for G and H. This is the reason for the gross asymmetry in the size of the circuits that appears in the statement of the lemma. The need for the differences in circuit size will be made clear in the proof of Theorem 1. The majority of the work in this paper goes towards proving the lemma correct. 
Lemma 2 (Diamond Isolation Lemma
Pr g∈G n ✸H n (C g n ) − Pr f ∈F n (C f n ) ≥ ε(n)δ(n) + 1 n c .
Conclusion: For infinitely many n there exists either a decision-circuit
, where Q n = Q C n , and for which
(We remind the reader that Q C represents the number of queries performed by circuit C.)
Akcoglu, Luby and Rackoff prove a similar lemma in [12] and [2] . It shows that the composition of two partially secure PRPGs results in a generator that is more secure than either of its constituents. Excluding the fact that their lemma is restricted to permutation generators instead of function generators and that they are concerned with composition as opposed to the ✸ operator, our lemma is stronger in two senses. First, the security requirement in the hypothesis is strictly weaker (i.e. the improvement in security from combining the two generators is stronger in our result). Second, the size of the distinguishing circuit for G is only additively larger than the distinguishing circuit for G✸H. In the Luby and Rackoff construction the distinguishing circuits for G and H are both multiplicatively larger than the circuit that distinguishes G • H. It is this second fact that permits our construction to achieve PRFGs, but prevents Luby and Rackoff from achieving more than a constant number of security amplifying compositions. Furthermore, our proof is simpler than that of Luby and Rackoff. This is due to the fact that their proof contains a corollary that corresponds to Lemma 7 in our proof, but, unlike Lemma 7, their corollary is only proven true with respect to the computational security of G H. This restriction is necessary for their construction, but increases the difficulty of the proof. We now prove that our construction produces a PRFG from a 1 − ε secure PRFG.
Theorem 1 (Diamond Composition Theorem).
Let ε: N → (0, 1) be a function, where ε is bounded away from 1 by an inverse polynomial. Let G be a polynomial. Let G be a
Proof. The intuition for this argument is as follows. Assume that F does not have the claimed security, and thus there is a family of distinguishing circuits for F that breaks the claimed security. We apply the Isolation Lemma to the generator F. The result is either that the generator G is not 1 − ε secure as claimed, or we have a family of distinguishing circuits (only slightly larger than the original circuit family) for a generator that is constructed from fewer applications of the ✸ operator (and thus fewer constituent G generators). We apply the Isolation Lemma inductively to this smaller generator until we are left with an ε(n) + 1/n c family of distinguishing circuits for the remaining generator G, which contradicts its assumed 1 − ε(n) security.
For sufficiently large n and some d > 0 let ε(n) < 1−1/n d . Assume for contradiction that there exists a distinguishing family of circuits {D n } and a c > 2d such that for infinitely many n,
, define the predicate P(i) as: there exists a family of circuits {D i,n } such that for infinitely many n,
where each circuit in the family is of size
Further, the restrictions on the size and number of queries performed by the circuits in {D p(n),n } are easily seen to hold, proving P( p(n)).
Inductive
Step. We assume the inductive hypothesis, P(i), holds for a particular 1 < i ≤ p(n), and prove it true for i − 1. By the inductive hypothesis there exists a family of ε(n)
We observe that F i = F i−1 ✸G, and therefore we can apply the Isolation Lemma to F i with the family of distinguishing circuits {D i,n }. Thus, either there exists a polynomial in n sized family of circuits {ϒ n } that break the assumed 1 − ε(n) security of G, causing a contradiction; or there exists a family of circuits {D i−1,n } such that
Further, each circuit D i−1,n performs Q D n oracle queries and has size
proving P(i − 1). By the principle of induction, P(1) holds, but this implies that the family of circuits {D 1,n } break the 1 − ε(n) security of F 1 = G, proving the theorem.
Observe the proof of Theorem 1 would not go through if the Isolation Lemma constructed distinguishers were both significantly larger than the original distinguisher. In particular, if the circuits defined by the predicate P(1) were super-polynomial in size, then the circuit would not break the security of F 1 = G, as the security claims of G are made relative to a polynomial-sized circuit. This observation makes the need for the asymmetry of the Isolation Lemma clear.
Proof of the Isolation Lemma
Intuitively, the Isolation Lemma claims that by combining two partially secure PRFGs with the ✸ operator, a new generator is formed that has insecurity proportional to the product of the insecurities of the two constituent generators. The lemma is stated in the contrapositive, with concern for the size of the distinguishing circuits, so that the lemma can be applied iteratively, as in Theorem 1. At this point the reader may wish to recall the statement of the Isolation Lemma.
At the highest level, the proof of the Isolation Lemma is easy to explain: assuming we have a family of εδ-distinguishing circuits, {C n }, for the constructed generator, G✸H, then we show how to construct either a family of δ-distinguishing circuits for the first constituent generator H, or a family of ε-distinguishing circuits for the second constituent generator G. Again, as we wish to apply this lemma iteratively, we need to ensure that one of the circuit families we create is not much larger than the original circuit family {C n }.
The proof proceeds as follows, we first demonstrate (Lemma 4) that either there exists a very simple algorithm that δ-distinguishes G from F, or it is the case that for every h ∈ H the ability of the distinguishing circuits {C n } to distinguish between h✸G and F is restricted: they can do no better than δ-distinguish. The existence of the simple algorithm would prove the Isolation Lemma, so we assume it is false and use the resulting restriction on the circuits {C n } (that δ-distinguish between F and h✸G) to construct a more complicated algorithm that ε-distinguishes H from F.
The second algorithm is developed by observing that, by assumption, the circuits in {C n } accept a fraction of G✸H that is "significantly larger" than εδ + Pr f ∈F (C f ). However, the restriction implies that for each h ∈ H not much more than a δ +Pr f ∈F (C f ) fraction of the functions in G✸h are accepted by C. As Pr ϕ∈G✸H (C ϕ ) is the expected value of Pr ϕ∈G✸h (C ϕ ) over the distribution H, it must be the case that Pr ϕ∈G✸h (C ϕ ) is "significantly larger" than Pr f ∈F (C f ) for at least an ε fraction of the h ∈ H. Given a function ω, our distinguishing circuit will approximate Pr ψ∈G✸ω (C ψ ) and accept if it is "significantly larger" than Pr f ∈F n (C f ). By the above argument this circuit will accept an ε fraction of the functions in H. In order for the circuit to ε-distinguish functions in H from random functions, the same circuit needs to accept almost no random functions. Lemma 5 shows that almost no random functions will be accepted by this circuit, proving the Isolation Lemma. The proof of Lemma 5 is involved and therefore is not presented until after the proof of the Isolation Lemma.
The Simple Algorithm
In this section we present Lemma 4. Its proof contains the simpler algorithm used to δ-distinguish G in the Isolation Lemma. The intuition is as follows: if there exists an infinite number of h ∈ H such that C can δ-distinguish between h✸G and h✸F, then we simply hard-wire the appropriate h's into the circuit. When the circuit is given a function ϕ, that is either in G or F, it simulates the execution of C with the oracle h✸ϕ. Alternatively, if there is not an infinite number of such h ∈ H, then C can do no better than δ-distinguish h✸H and h✸F. By observing that for every h ∈ F the distributions h✸F and F are the same, we note that C cannot δ-distinguish h✸H from F.
We first demonstrate that if you form a distribution on functions by combining any particular function with the uniform distribution over F using the ✸ operator, then the resulting distribution is identical to the uniform distribution over F.
Lemma 3. Fix n. For each h ∈ F
n , the distribution h✸F n and the uniform distribution over F n are identical.
Proof. Fix r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} n and fix h ∈ F n , then for every
Lemma 4.
Either there exists a family of decision-circuits { n }, where for each n the circuit n is of size ≤ Q C n 2c H (n) + s C (n); Q n = Q C n ; and for infinitely many n,
or for all sufficiently large n and all h ∈ H n , Pr
(We remind the reader that Q C represents the number of oracle queries performed by circuit C.)
Proof. Suppose it is the case that for infinitely many n there exists an h ∈ H n such that |Pr g∈G✸h (C
For each such n we create a decision circuit n , where
It is easy to see that C n can be modified, in a straightforward manner, by adding Q C n (C H (n) + 10n) gates and wires to compute n , while still using Q C n oracle gates. For simplicity of presentation in this paper we have assumed that 10n ≤ C H (n), giving us a circuit of size ≤ s C (n) + Q C n (2C H (n) ).
The Complicated Algorithm and the Main Argument
We now present the argument for the Isolation Lemma. It contains the more complicated distinguishing algorithm that was previously described.
We begin by assuming the hypothesis of the Isolation Lemma. Further, we drop the absolute value from the hypothesis and simply assume that for infinitely many n,
for if this is not the case we can flip the output bit of C n . By Lemma 4 (stated above), we assume that for all sufficiently large n and all h ∈ H n , Pr
We outline the argument and remind the reader that in such outlines we drop the index n as well as additive inverse polynomial terms. As stated earlier, we will construct a circuit that on input w approximates the value of Pr f ∈G✸w (C f ) and accepts if it is sufficiently larger than Pr f ∈F (C f ). By Lemma 5 almost no random functions will be accepted by such a circuit. It needs to be demonstrated that at least an ε-fraction of the h ∈ H will be accepted. This is done by an averaging argument. Suppose less than an ε-fraction of the h ∈ H are accepted by our circuit. For those h's that are accepted it is the case that
, by the fact that they are not accepted by the circuit. However, this implies that
, and this contradicts (1), the assumed security of G✸H.
Lemma 5. For all families of polynomial-sized decision circuit families {C n }, for i > 0 and for each n let
Then for all i,j, Pr w∈F n (w ∈ S n (i)) ≤ 1/n j , for sufficiently large n.
The proof of Lemma 5 is presented in Section 3.5. In the remainder of this proof we assume n is fixed and sufficiently large for all inequalities to hold. Therefore, n will be dropped from notation wherever possible. We refer the reader back to the end of Section 3.2 for a reminder of how notation is modified. We commence construction of the ε-distinguishing circuit by noting that, although for a given w ∈ F we cannot compute Pr ϕ∈G✸ω (C ϕ ) in polynomial time, we can approximate it with the probabilistic circuit A:
where g 1 , . . . , g n b ∈ G n and k
n are randomly chosen. Let κ(n) be the length of the key of H n , and set (with foresight) α > 1 so that n α > κ(n). Using the Chernoff Bound, b is chosen large enough so that
Note that for all of the h ∈ H,
since for each k ∈ {0, 1} κ(n) the probability of picking h k from H is at least 1/2
From A we create the decision circuit ϒ which accepts the function oracle w iff
The following claim shows that ϒ will accept an ε-fraction of the functions from H.
Claim. For all sufficiently large n,
Proof. Again we fix n so that it is sufficiently large such that all of the inequalities below hold. Assume for contradiction that Pr
, and let T be its complement.
Equation (4) follows from two facts. First, by assumption, the probability that a random h ∈ H is in T is at most 1. Second, for each h ∈ T , A h −Pr f ∈F (C f ) < 1/n 3c . Equation (5) also follows from two facts. First, by assumption, (6) follows from the facts that ε(n) ≤ 1 − 1/n c/2 and δ ≤ 1. Equation (7) contradicts the fact that
Putting together the previous claim with Lemma 5, it is clear that ϒ accepts an ε-fraction of the functions in H and a negligible fraction of random functions. The technical details are presented below:
(for sufficiently large n).
Equation (8) follows as A ω approximates Pr g∈G✸ω (C g ) to within a factor of 1/n 3c for all but 1/2 n α of the ω ∈ F. Equation (9) follows by a direct application of Lemma 5.
By constructing, for all applicable n, the circuit ϒ n in a straightforward manner and using standard circuit derandomization techniques, we can see that there exists a fixed polynomial p, for which the size of ϒ n is bound by p(n c · c G (n))s C (n).
Proof of Lemma 5
We begin with an outline of the proof of Lemma 5. We note that the essence of the proof lies in showing that for almost every function f , polynomial-sized circuits cannot distinguish between a function chosen randomly from F n and a function chosen randomly
n }. It follows that for a randomly chosen f from F n the same circuits are not able to distinguish between random functions and those in G✸ f , proving the lemma.
The majority of work in this section goes into showing that for almost all functions f , polynomial-sized circuits cannot distinguish between functions chosen randomly from This result is proven by demonstrating that there is a random variable that, with very high probability, is a good approximation to both the probability that a circuit C accepts a random function and the probability that the circuit accepts a function from I( f ). The random variable is an approximation of the value Pr g∈I( f ) (C g ). This approximation is calculated by taking the average acceptance rate of C on a polynomial number of functions chosen randomly from I( f ). It is the case that, with high probability, we can simulate many executions of C, given functions chosen uniformly at random from I( f ) by simply executing C and responding to its oracle queries with random strings. Of course, one has to be careful that given two oracles g 1 , g 2 ∈ I( f ), the responses to the oracle queries of C g 1 and C g 2 are not inconsistent with an underlying random f . However, because of the random offsets r 1 and r 2 , where g i (x) = f r i ⊕ , it is unlikely that such responses will be inconsistent, and therefore with high probability we can approximate Pr g∈I( f ) (C g ). It is clear that the same process can be used to approximate Pr f ∈F (C f ), and therefore the same value is a good approximation to both values of interest and therefore the difference between the two values must be quite small. 
We remind the reader that we have modified all our circuits so that they will never repeat oracle queries, and each circuit C n performs exactly m(n) queries.
Proof.
We assume the n is sufficiently large for all inequalities in this proof to hold and that n is fixed. Accordingly, we drop the index n from our notation as described at the end of Section 3.2. We assume that r is fixed, and later we show how to determine r 's value.
First we define two experiments. In the first experiment pick random (
, and evaluate C( f i ) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n r }. Define the event E 1 to be
In the second experiment pick random ( f, k 1 , . . . , k n r ) ∈ F × {0, 1}(n 2r ), and evaluate
Using the Chernoff Bound (Lemma 1) we choose an r where the probability of event E 1 occurring in the first experiment is less than 1/2 n/2 . We will show that the probability OF18 S. Myers
and j exist, then we say a collision has occurred. A collision corresponds to a bad choice of k i , and therefore f is inadvertently being evaluated twice on the same input, and therefore we have to make sure that the two query responses are consistent.
In order to ensure consistency, if a collision has occurred during the simulation of the evaluation of the C Observe that this method of evaluating C models experiment two. Let E 2 be the event in experiment three that corresponds to E 2 in experiment two.
Note that the model of the second experiment is identical to the model of the first except in those cases in which a collision occurs. We define E 3 to be the event that a collision occurred during the third experiment. Clearly E 2 ⊆ E 1 ∪ E 3 , which implies that Pr(E 2 ) ≤ Pr(E 1 ) + Pr(E 3 ). Since the probability of E 1 is less than 1/2 n/2 the probability of E 1 is less than 1/2 n/2 . Therefore, it suffices to show that the probability of event E 3 is less than 1/2 n/2 in order to prove that the probability of E 2 is less than 1/2 n/3 . This implies that the probability of E 2 is less than 1/2 n/3 , and this proves the lemma.
We bound from above the probability of event E 3 . We note that during the simulation of the evaluation of C 
⊕ is at most ((m(n))
2 · (i − 1))/2 n . We note that the probability of a collision occurring in experiment three is less than the sum of the probabilities of a collision occurring during the simulation of the evaluations of C f k i ⊕ for each i. Therefore,
(for sufficiently large n). 
Proof. The intuition behind this proof is as follows. We use Lemma 6 to establish with high probability for random w and 
n . By Lemma 6 we know that there exists an r 0 such that ∀r > r 0 and for all sufficiently large n,
By the Chernoff Bound we know that there exists a t 0 such that ∀t > t 0 and for all sufficiently large n,
Let v = max{t 0 , r 0 }, and consider the probability that either of the events occurs:
It follows for all sufficiently large n that
This can be rewritten as Then for all i,j, Pr w∈F n (w ∈ S n (i)) ≤ 1/n j , for sufficiently large n.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there exists an i and j such that for infinitely many n, Pr w∈F n (w ∈ S n (i)) ≥ 1/n j . We show this contradicts Lemma 7. We fix n and drop the index from the notation. Note that since Pr ϕ∈G✸S(i) (C ϕ ) ≥ Pr f ∈F (C f )+1/n i , then by an averaging argument we can fix a g ∈ G such that Pr h∈g✸S(i) (C h ) ≥ Pr f ∈F (C f ) + 1/n i . Using the first moment method we note that given g there must be a 1/n 2i fraction of w ∈ S(i) that have the "good" property that Pr ψ∈g✸w (C ψ ) ≥ Pr f ∈F (C f ) + 1/n 2i . Since Pr w∈F (w ∈ S(i)) ≥ 1/n j , the probability that a random w has the "good" property is 1/n 2i+ j , and this contradicts Lemma 7.
Discussion and Further Research
We have presented a relatively simple and efficient construction for transforming a partially secure PRFG into a strongly secure PRFG. We believe this construction could possibly be used to guide the development of block-ciphers in the future. However, the construction may be useful only in outer layers of the cipher, after a certain minimal amount of security has been achieved by other means.
Some Observations on the Uniform Adversarial Model
The proofs in this paper have been presented with respect to a non-uniform adversary. As referred to earlier, the same proof can be re-worked to hold with respect to a uniform adversary. We present some of the more important points. First, we re-state the Isolation Lemma with respect to polynomial-time constructible probabilistic circuits, as opposed to non-uniform circuit families. We present the uniform version below:
Lemma 9 (Uniform Version of Diamond Isolation Lemma). Let p, ε, δ and d be as they were in Lemma 2. Let H and G be function generators whose circuits can be constructed in polynomial-time, where c G (n) and c H (n) are polynomials that bound from above the size of the circuits that compute the function generators respectively.
than Pr ϕ∈G✸h (C ϕ ) − Pr f ∈F (C f ) < δ(n) + 1/n c holding for each h ∈ H, it only holds for a 1 − 1/n 3c fraction of the h ∈ H. This modifies the probability calculations by an additive term of 1/n 3c , but there is enough slack in the inequalities involved in the claim that it does not affect the result of the claim.
Finally, a new version of Theorem 1 can be proven by taking into account the slightly weaker distinguishing probabilities achieved by the uniform version of the Isolation Lemma.
Future Research and Open Problems
As has been previously mentioned, there are significant similarities between this proof and Levin's proof of the XOR Lemma. Further, as was previously mentioned, there are several different proofs of Yao's XOR Lemma. Given the parallels between Levin's result and our own, it is interesting to question if any of the other proof techniques used to prove the XOR Lemma can be used to prove security amplification in the context of a weak PRFG.
For example, it is interesting to ask if there is some natural notion for a weak PRFG that corresponds to hard-core sets of weakly unpredictable predicates, as proposed by Impagliazzo [9] . One natural notion for a hard-core set of weak PRFGs is to consider subsets of keys for the generator that correspond to "random" looking functions. However, this notion does not seem to work well as there are examples of weak PRFGs that have no hard-core sets using this notion. Consider the sketched construction used in Section 3.1. Every subset of keys of this generator will correspond to a set of functions that can be distinguished with probability at least 1 2 , and thus are not very "random". Of course, there might be another notion of a hard-core set that is more applicable to weak PRFGs.
We believe it is an interesting open question to determine if any of the other proofs of the XOR Lemma have natural analogies for security amplification of weak PRFGs.
